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Systemic corruption is an endemic problem in countries
emerging from violent conﬂict (Cheng & Zaum, 2013;
Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014). Higher corruption is negatively
related to the quality of post-conﬂict peace (Global Peace
Index, 2015), it increases the risk of renewed ethnic conﬂict
(Neudorfer & Theuerkauf, 2014) and is generally assumed to
have negative eﬀects on long-term economic development
(Aidt, 2003). The weakly institutionalized environments of
many contemporary post-conﬂict states are an ideal breeding
ground for practices that allow the use of public oﬃce for pri-
vate gain—the common deﬁnition of corruption that we fol-
low (Svensson, 2005). Given this substantive signiﬁcance of
corruption in post-conﬂict situations, we observe a surpris-
ingly wide variation in corruption practices across post-
conﬂict states. Although all post-conﬂict countries score, on
average, lower on corruption indices than countries without
a history of violent conﬂict, there are stark diﬀerences in the
level of corruption within the group of post-conﬂict countries.
States such as Rwanda, Peru, or Croatia are less aﬀected by
systematic bribery, patronage, and clientelism than, for
instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Liberia.
What accounts for this variation?
We argue that one of the main drivers of systematic post-
conﬂict corruption is the presence of political power-sharing
institutions in a country. We conceptualize government elites
in any post-conﬂict situation as individual rent-seeking agents
that need to ensure the support of their key constituencies to
remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, &
Morrow, 2003). We expect power-sharing institutions—parti
cularly cabinet-level, executive power-sharing institutions—
to systematically shape these rent-seeking motives. Power-60sharing cabinets create political coalitions dominated by small
circles of government and rebel elites with direct access to state
resources and low levels of loyalty toward the government lea-
der (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Also, the provisional
nature of many power-sharing institutions increases rent-
seeking incentives: facing a limited time horizon in oﬃce,
rent-seeking elites within the power-sharing coalition are likely
to capture as many rents as possible before they have to leave
oﬃce (Levi, 1989). Based on this logic, we argue that post-
conﬂict countries with power-sharing institutions are on aver-
age associated with higher aggregate levels of rent-seeking
conceptualized and measured as the overall level of corruption
in a country. We also suspect that power-sharing institutions
are more likely to increase corruption when there are higher
levels of resources that are easy to capture, such as natural
resources or foreign aid.
We test these predictions with a statistical time-series cross-
sectional analysis of post-conﬂict situations during 1996–2010.
Our dependent variable measures the extent of corruption in a
country using data from the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). We rely on theCDTH6H). Final revision accepted: July 2, 2017.
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2015) to capture the practices of executive power-sharing in
the aftermath of negotiated settlements. In contrast to the
large majority of existing data collections on power-sharing,
PSED moves beyond the coding of the mere promises of
power-sharing found in peace agreements. Instead, PSED
explicitly records whether and when power-sharing between
the government and former rebels has taken place in a post-
conﬂict period and when it was abolished again. PSED there-
fore provides us with time-variant data on actual rebel access
to state resources. Consistent with our predictions, we ﬁnd
empirical support for our hypothesis that executive power-
sharing increases the level of corruption in a post-conﬂict
country. Our analysis also ﬁnds this rent-seeking behavior to
be more pronounced in countries with higher levels of natural
resource wealth. Our empirical results are robust to a range of
alternative model speciﬁcations and treatment selection mod-
els that account for the endogenous selection of power-
sharing governments.
This article makes several notable contributions. First, we
advance the literature on power-sharing after civil conﬂict.
Most scholars and practitioners assume that power-sharing
functions by mitigating commitment problems between gov-
ernment and rebels (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Building on
this theoretical assumption, they explore how power-sharing
aﬀects civil war recurrence. In contrast, we shed light on the
mechanisms through which power-sharing works by exploring
the relationship between executive power-sharing and corrup-
tion using new data on the implementation and duration of
these arrangements (Ottmann & Vu¨llers, 2015). We identify
a speciﬁc channel through which such commitment may be
secured: the buying oﬀ of violent actors and the distribution
of spoils from the state. We also add quantitative evidence
to the largely case-study-based research on post-conﬂict cor-
ruption (Cheng & Zaum, 2013; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014).
By statistically isolating the eﬀect of power-sharing on corrup-
tion, we identify a major driver of corruption in post-conﬂict
settings beyond single cases.
Second, we make a more general contribution to the
broader study of the institutional determinants of corruption
in developing countries. In this line of research, scholars typi-
cally investigate the long-term eﬀects of structural changes in
key institutions—such as the democratization of political insti-
tutions or improvements to the rule of law—on corruption
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Iwasaki & Suzuki, 2012; Jetter,
Agudelo, & Hassan, 2015). Taking this research further, we
focus on an important subset of countries in the developing
world, post-conﬂict countries, and show that even short-
lived transitional power-sharing governments in these coun-
tries can have a substantial eﬀect on corruption levels.
These academic contributions enable us to inject new empir-
ical evidence into a critical policy debate. Notwithstanding its
mixed track record (Binningsbø, 2013), power-sharing remains
a popular conﬂict-resolution method for policy-makers at the
United Nations and foreign ministries around the world. Most
recently, it has been discussed as a key element of a prospec-
tive negotiated settlement to the Syrian conﬂict (Groarke,
2016). Executive power-sharing was also central in the recently
failed peace agreement in South Sudan (Kindersley &
Rolandsen, 2016). But our ﬁndings highlight an inconvenient
trade-oﬀ inherent to these arrangements. Power-sharing
between government and rebels might be necessary to halt
continued bloodshed. At the same time, power-sharing is also
a main driver of corruption in post-conﬂict countries. While
this corruption might be a necessary element of securing the
peace, it threatens the long-term perspectives of post-conﬂictcountries. Policy-makers should therefore focus not only on
how to design successful power-sharing deals but also on
how a country can transition away from power-sharing once
the risk of civil war recurrence has substantially subsided.2. CORRUPTION IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
Scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize corruption
as one of the key challenges faced by countries emerging from
violent conﬂict (Cheng & Zaum, 2013; Lindberg & Orjuela,
2014; Transparency International, 2014; Working Group on
Corruption and Security, 2017). This recognition builds on
the insight that post-conﬂict countries are, on average, more
corrupt than countries not aﬀected by conﬂict (see left panel
in Figure 1). Typically, the eﬀects of corruption in post-
conﬂict contexts are characterized as a trade-oﬀ between
short-term stability and long-term negative eﬀects on political
and economic development (Cheng & Zaum, 2013; Lindberg
& Orjuela, 2014). Cheng and Zaum (2013, p. 10) observe that
‘‘[w]hen the proceeds of corruption ﬂow through [patronage]
networks during a period of political instability, then these
funds can be used to cement loyalties and relationships which
can, in turn, help to stabilize the emerging post-war order.”
These expectations are in line with the more general ﬁnding
that elites in corrupt countries can use oil rents to ‘‘buy peace”
by co-opting regime opponents (Fjelde & Soysa, 2009). In the
long-term, however, rampant corruption can deepen inter-
group mistrust, particularly if one societal group is perceived
to beneﬁt more from corruption than any other group. Citing
evidence from Sri Lanka, Orjuela (2014, p. 760) reports sub-
stantial diﬀerences in corruption perceptions across ethnic
groups. This ﬁnding is echoed by quantitative evidence show-
ing corruption to be a driver of ethnic civil war onset
(Neudorfer & Theuerkauf, 2014). More generally, the negative
long-term eﬀects of corruption in post-conﬂict countries stem
from the insight that corruption hampers economic growth
(d’Agostino, Dunne, & Pieroni, 2016; Serritzlew,
Sønderskov, & Svendsen, 2014) and democratic development
(Fukuyama, 2014, chap. 5; Warren, 2004), by entrenching
established elites and their patronage networks.
These eﬀects are particularly interesting since we observe
much variation in the degree of corruption across post-
conﬂict countries (see the right panel in Figure 1). One poten-
tial driver of corruption is the inﬂuence of natural resource
abundance on corruption in certain post-conﬂict contexts.
Billon (2014) argues that natural resources, such as oil, dia-
monds, timber, or coal can feed post-conﬂict corruption, but
this relationship is mediated by the quality of existing institu-
tions and socio-economic inequalities (see also Rustad, Lujala,
& Le Billon, 2012). This insight is linked to quantitative
evidence on the conditional eﬀect of resource income on
democracy and conﬂict in the context of high-quality and/or
high-capacity institutions (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Dunning,
2008; Ross, 2015).
Another variable that features prominently in the studies on
drivers of post-conﬂict corruption is international engage-
ment, particularly the sudden inﬂow of foreign aid and its
impact on corruption. Aid in post-conﬂict contexts, argues
von Billerbeck (2013, p. 82), implies a ‘‘sudden availability
of rents, combined with [. . .] distorted economic conditions
[that] makes post-conﬂict settings rife with opportunities for
corruption.” In 2008, for instance, aid to post-conﬂict Liberia
peaked at almost 200% of the national gross-domestic pro-
duct, dwarﬁng the local economy. But it is not only recon-
struction and humanitarian aid inﬂows that increase
Figure 1. Corruption in (non-)post-conﬂict countries in comparison. Note: Lower values on the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index indicate higher
corruption. Dashed lines in the left panel indicate group means. The right panel displays the mean level of corruption in the post-conﬂict countries listed on the
y-axis. Data Source: World Governance Indicators (2015), authors’ graphic. For details on the sample of post-conﬂict countries, see below.
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peace operations, too, is often accompanied by the establish-
ment of a ‘‘peacekeeping economy” that not only exceeds
the conﬂict-ridden national economy by orders of magnitude,
but also provides a multitude of opportunities for corruption
for both national and international personnel (cf. Cheng &
Zaum, 2013, p. 13; see also, for instance, Beber, Gilligan,
Guardado, & Karim, 2017 on transactional sex between UN
peacekeepers and the local population).
Besides natural resources and international involvement,
other causes of post-conﬂict corruption remain under-
researched and at the level of scattered single case studies or
anecdotal evidence. One variable often mentioned in this con-
text is power-sharing arrangements, that is institutions that
incorporate former battleﬁeld adversaries (or, more precisely,
their elites) in joint formal political institutions, such as the
cabinet or territorial autonomy structures (Hartzell &
Hoddie, 2007). As Cheng and Zaum (2013, p. 8) posit, ‘‘in
some post-conﬂict settlements, it has been the opportunities
for corruption and patronage that were negotiated as part of
the power-sharing agreements that have literally helped to
‘buy out’ potential spoilers in a conﬂict.” This observation is
bolstered by qualitative evidence of a positive relationship
between power-sharing and corruption from countries such
as Liberia (Reno, 2013), the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Wolters & Kaiser, 2013), Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Belloni & Strazzari, 2014), or Aceh in Indonesia (Aspinall,
2009).
Given the substantive research program on power-sharing
institutions, it is notable, however, that no systematic, quanti-
tative evidence exists as to whether or not power-sharing
arrangements indeed drive post-conﬂict corruption. Most
scholars regard power-sharing primarily as a tool to end pro-
tracted violent conﬂict between the government of a state andrebel groups (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad & Nilsson,
2008; Walter, 2002). Building on bargaining theory (Fearon,
1995; Walter, 2002), researchers argue that power-sharing pro-
vides an institutional framework that allows governments as
well as rebels to overcome their security dilemma and credibly
commit to a peace deal without fearing the defection of the
other side. However, empirical research on the relationship
between power-sharing on the one hand and conﬂict manage-
ment and democratization on the other has brought about
contradictory results. Some ﬁnd empirical support for a rela-
tionship between these factors (Norris, 2008) while others do
not (Horowitz, 1985). Likewise, some scholars present evi-
dence for a violence-reducing and democracy-enhancing eﬀect
of power-sharing (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007, 2015), while
others argue against such a relationship (Jarstad, 2008; Tull
& Mehler, 2005). None of these studies, however, address
the question of whether and under which circumstances
power-sharing institutions systematically shape the extent of
post-conﬂict corruption.3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POWER-SHARING
Our argument about the relationship between power-
sharing and corruption starts from the general observation
that government elites are the central political actors in all
post-conﬂict situations—regardless of whether a power-
sharing arrangement is implemented or not. We conceptualize
these elites as rent-seeking agents who use public political
oﬃce to generate private income (Krueger, 1974). However,
corrupt or rent-seeking behavior serves the purpose not only
of maximizing the purely private economic beneﬁts of political
leaders, but also of maximizing their private political beneﬁts:
rents from political oﬃce provide political leaders with the
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Robinson, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Politicians,
in this view, distribute public funds from taxes, natural
resources, and foreign aid through patronage networks to
buy political support from key constituencies, whose backing
is essential for leaders to stay in oﬃce.
The assumption of rent-seeking government elites is based
on scholarship about the political economy of historical state
development–a situation very similar to contemporary state
building processes in post-conﬂict situations (Bates, 2008;
Herbst, 2000; North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). A stylized
and condensed version of the argument in the state develop-
ment literature about the relationship between government
elites and rent-seeking goes as follows: Political order in the
form of states provides elites with a mechanism to generate
rents from taxation. In turn, internal violent conﬂict decreases
returns from rents because it negatively aﬀects production.
Therefore, elites form dominant coalitions—governments—t
o limit violence between their respective groups and ensure
rent generation. In this process, elites become ‘‘stationary
bandits” (Olson, 1993) of a diﬀerent sort, providing basic state
functions as state agents in exchange for the opportunity to
receive tax income (North et al., 2009; North, Wallis, Webb,
& Weingast, 2012).
In a post-conﬂict situation, the rent-seeking behavior of
government elites also assumes such a central role due to
another core feature of post-conﬂict politics: the elite-
constituency relationship between former conﬂict actors and
their support groups. Although the relationship between polit-
ical elites and their political support networks is a central fea-
ture of any political system (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), it
is particularly pronounced in post-conﬂict settings. Whereas in
all political systems elites rely on their constituencies to ensure
their political survival, in post-conﬂict settings elites rely on
constituency support for political and physical survival.
Post-conﬂict settings are inherently unstable and elites cannot
be certain that conﬂict will not recur (Walter, 2009). If they
lose the support of their political networks, they are unlikely
to be able to mobilize enough resources to survive the resur-
gence of conﬂict. Thus, government elites depend critically
on their constituencies which provided the necessary recruits
and political and material support during the conﬂict
(Kalyvas, 2006; Ottmann, 2017). These constituencies also
form the electorate of the related political parties in peace
times (Utas, 2012).
We understand this selective resource allocation in post-
conﬂict countries in close reference to political patronage as
the politically motivated distribution of selected private bene-
ﬁts to relevant constituencies by political elites (Erdmann &
Engel, 2007). These resources can take the form of public
infrastructure investments, such as electriﬁcation, the building
of road networks, construction, the implementation of foreign
aid projects, or any other public service. However, such pref-
erential resource allocation is rarely directly observable. We
therefore focus on the general level of rent-seeking in a soci-
ety—namely the extent to which a society is able to control
corruption. Corruption is deﬁned as the ‘‘misuse of public
oﬃce for private gain” (Svensson, 2005, p. 207). The term
therefore subsumes these allocation procedures, but remains
on a more general level.
Why should power-sharing institutions increase elite corrup-
tion? Post-conﬂict power-sharing establishes rules mandating
joint control of power and sets up institutions dividing power
between the involved actors. Power-sharing thus deﬁnes the
shape of the dominant coalition elites can build to limitviolence between them and ensure their privileged access to
rents (North et al., 2009, 2012). This is especially the case when
power-sharing takes place on a national executive level. In this
form of power-sharing, rebel representatives are explicitly
granted seats in a joint government cabinet, typically in the
context of a transitional ‘‘grand coalition.” These executive
power-sharing governments promote elites’ rent-seeking
behavior and the subsequent selective distribution of rents to
their constituencies in three distinct ways.
First, executive power-sharing arrangements restrict mem-
bership to the small circle of government and rebel elites
who have signed the peace agreement and deliberately exclude
all other elites and social groups (Jarstad, 2008; Ottmann &
Vu¨llers, 2015). At least until the ﬁrst national elections these
signatories have agreed upon, this coalition cannot be
enlarged without threatening the stability of the settlement
and a return to full-scale civil war (Reilly, 2008). While exec-
utive power-sharing arrangements might increase the overall
number of cabinet positions in a national government, empir-
ical studies indicate that executive power-sharing does not nec-
essarily equate with an enlargement of the overall winning
coalition (Joshi & Mason, 2011; Roeder & Rothchild,
2005). 1 It is therefore safe to assume that executive power-
sharing merely replaces government elites with rebel elites.
Executive power-sharing thus creates (or simply maintains)
what is called a small winning coalition in the literature
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) by eﬀectively preventing
other elites and larger segments of the population from partic-
ipating in government. 2 Generally, a winning coalition is the
subset of a country’s selectorate able to provide the necessary
support to maintain the leader’s rule over the larger selectorate
and disenfranchised members of the society. In exchange for
support, the leader distributes private and public goods to
the members of the winning coalition. In winning coalitions
composed of large sections of the selectorate, it is too costly
to dole out private beneﬁts. Leaders therefore reduce the pro-
vision of private goods in favor of providing public goods for
the wider selectorate. In small winning coalitions, however, it
is cheaper to distribute private beneﬁts to the members which,
in turn, allow these elites to engage in corrupt behavior. As
countries with power-sharing governments solidify a small
winning coalition by restricting access to political power for
all groups outside the agreement, these countries should also
see an increase in corruption.
Second, the rebel elites in a power-sharing government have
only recently stopped ﬁghting the incumbent leadership. Trust
between the former adversaries will therefore understandably
be low (Walter, 2009). Both sides often also still possess the
outside option of resorting to arms again should they feel that
the peace agreement does not serve their interests. That is, they
do not depend critically on the incumbent leader but could
instead try again to depose him or her. Executive power-
sharing therefore creates winning coalitions with elites who
have relatively low levels of loyalty toward the government
leader. Scholars understand loyalty as the extent to which
elites have the opportunity to successfully switch their alle-
giance to a challenger putting together a competing winning
coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Elites who do
not have this option to defect are ﬁercely loyal to the incum-
bent leader as they face the risk of losing their privileged access
to rents should they be excluded from the winning coalition.
Knowing this, the leader can aﬀord to oﬀer fewer private ben-
eﬁts to these elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, p. 66).
Executive power-sharing arrangements, however, replace
some of these highly loyal elites with less loyal rebels. To
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has to pay a higher price and provide more private beneﬁts
to rebel elites to keep them within the winning coalition.
Finally, executive power-sharing creates a limited time
horizon for rent-seeking elites. Executive power-sharing
arrangements are often temporally limited, because transi-
tional governments are replaced by elected governments
(Schmidt & Galyan, 2016). Rebel participation in power-
sharing is largely a function of their strength on the
battleﬁeld (or at least their ability to inﬂict costs on the
government). It is not necessarily a result of their popular
support, and thus electoral success is uncertain. Rational
elites facing the strong possibility of a temporal limit in oﬃce
discount the future more steeply (Levi, 1989). Facing uncer-
tainty over their involvement in the future government once
power-sharing ends or, worse, the possibility of renewed
violence if the other side reneges on the agreement, rebel
and government elites become what Mancur Olson has
famously labeled ‘‘roving bandits”—that is rulers who are
not concerned with the future welfare of their citizens, but
who prey on these citizens instead: ‘‘when an autocrat has
no reason to consider the future output of the society at
all, his incentives are those of a roving bandit and that is
what he becomes” (Olson, 1993, p. 571). This discounting
of the future is echoed by Bates, Greif, and Singh (2002, p.
621) (see also Bates, 2008): ‘‘in the early stages of democrati-
zation, an increase in uncertainty for incumbent elites can be
expected to bring, ceteris paribus, increased levels of political
predation.” Thus, the limited time horizon of power-sharing
arrangements further increases elites’ incentives to engage in
short-term, private rent-seeking behavior.
Against this background of small winning coalitions with
rebel elites who exhibit low levels of loyalty toward the leader
and only have a limited time horizon, we expect that executive
power-sharing arrangements should be associated with higher
levels of corruption.
Hypothesis 1. Executive power-sharing in post-conﬂict coun-
tries increases the level of corruption.
The impact of executive power-sharing on elite corruption is
moderated by the level and type of resources available to
elites. First and foremost, a leader draws on government rev-
enue generated through taxation. But this is not the only
source of government income. Leaders can also rely on rev-
enue generated from natural resources and foreign aid.
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) regard such non-tax
government income as ‘‘free resources” that are easy to cap-
ture: They do not require citizens to participate in the econ-
omy and, consequently, the government does not have to
provide public goods to the population in order to facilitate
their exploitation. If a post-conﬂict power-sharing government
has access to more resources that elites can capture more
easily, we consequently expect elites to be engaged in higher
levels of corruption.
Rents from natural resources can be captured more easily
than foreign aid, because they are highly fungible, not
attached to political conditions, and typically more constant
than foreign aid (Altincekic & Bearce, 2014). Resource rents
provide political elites with a source of windfall revenues that
substitute for government income obtained via taxation of the
population. Since governments with access to non-tax income
do not rely on taxing their population they have reduced
incentives to respond to their citizens’ needs. This allows elites
to distribute non-tax government income through patronage
networks instead of publicly investing in socially beneﬁcialoutcomes (Ahmadov, 2014; Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-
Querol, 2008; Dunning, 2008; Ross, 2004). That means that
elites in power-sharing arrangements with access to high levels
of natural resource income have access to more resources
overall, which, in turn, enables them to direct and implement
more preferential policies.
Hypothesis 2. The larger the windfall gains from natural
resources in a post-conﬂict country, the stronger the positive
relationship between power-sharing and corruption.
We also regard foreign aid as a source of non-tax govern-
ment income. 3 This holds true both for more fungible types
of aid such as budget support or debt relief as well as for more
sector-speciﬁc projects, such as the provision of health ser-
vices, infrastructure projects, or technical cooperation on agri-
cultural support. Fungible aid allows elites to capture aid
money more easily and divert it to their patronage networks,
through salaries, jobs or simply bribes (Svensson, 2000). Speci-
ﬁc aid projects are much more diﬃcult to capture directly. But
they do require an allocation decision which elites will try to
inﬂuence in order to steer more valuable projects to the
regions on whose political support they rely to stay in power
(Hodler & Raschky, 2014). In addition, higher aid ﬂows typi-
cally indicate the presence of numerous donors. If many
donors compete over the policy concessions of the recipient,
rent-seeking recipient government elites—such as elites in
power-sharing governments—can reap the surplus beneﬁts of
such donor competition for their own political purposes
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2016).
Hypothesis 3. The larger the windfall gains from international
aid in a post-conﬂict country, the stronger the positive
relationship between power-sharing and corruption.4. DATA
To test these hypotheses we turn to a statistical analysis. The
unit of analysis is the post-conﬂict country in a given year. We
start out by constructing a sample of the country-years after
civil war as recorded by the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program
(UCDP) during 1990–2010 (Themne´r & Wallensteen,
2013). 4 We restrict our sample to the ﬁrst ﬁve post-conﬂict
years, given the data limitations of our power-sharing variable
(see below) and the convention in the literature. 5 For any
given country-year to be included in our sample there have
to be at least two consecutive years of no armed conﬂict. 6 This
ensures a minimum of post-conﬂict development and excludes
one-year post-conﬂict periods, which typically indicate a cessa-
tion of hostilities, but not necessarily the end of the conﬂict.
Because our dependent variable is only available for 1996
and later, we also exclude all country-years prior to 1996.
These selection criteria result in 70 distinct post-conﬂict peri-
ods in 51 countries. 7
To measure corruption, we include data on the level of cor-
ruption in a post-conﬂict country in a given year. Corruption
can take many diﬀerent forms, including vote-buying, prefer-
ential policy treatment, or the clientelistic distribution of pub-
lic oﬃces (Svensson, 2000; van de Walle, 2001). However, data
on these phenomena are scarce, since they typically do not
take place in the open. We therefore measure corruption using
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann
et al., 2010), which aggregate expert opinions on corruption
levels in a country. The WGI measure Control of Corruption
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exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites
and private interests” (World Governance Indicators, 2015,
p. 4). This measure is based on a wide variety of sources, pre-
dominantly expert assessments of countries. The WGI quanti-
ﬁes these assessments. The Control of Corruption measure
ranges between 2.5 and 2.5 and measures a country’s level
of corruption relative to the global average in a given year.
Mexico, for instance, has a value of 0.15 for 2003, whereas
the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a Control of Cor-
ruption score of 1.43 for 2003. This indicates that both coun-
tries were more corrupt than the global average in 2003, but
that the Democratic Republic of Congo was substantially
more corrupt than Mexico. Unfortunately, the Control of Cor-
ruption measure is not available for all country-years in our
sample. It starts with biannual measures in 1996 and becomes
available annually only from 2002. 8
We rely on the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) to
assess the impact of power-sharing on the level of corruption
in a post-conﬂict country (Ottmann & Vu¨llers, 2015). Among
other things, PSED includes detailed information on the type
and timing of our central explanatory variable, power-sharing
on the national executive level. It records when the representa-
tives of a rebel signatory to a peace agreement joined the
national government of the country by taking over particular
cabinet positions and when these rebel representatives left
these positions again. In doing so, PSED oﬀers one of the ﬁrst
dynamic measures of government-rebel power-sharing
arrangements in the aftermath of civil wars. For our subse-
quent statistical analysis, we construct a binary variable—
Executive Power-Sharing—which takes the value of ‘‘1” when
former rebels have taken over positions in the national govern-
ment in a given year. For all post-conﬂict years without such
power-sharing, the binary variable takes the value of ‘‘0.”
Overall, there are 13 post-conﬂict countries with a total of
47 country-years with executive power-sharing.
We also suggest that the eﬀect of power-sharing on corrup-
tion should be stronger in the context of resources that can be
captured. We measure the level of resources available to the
power-sharing elites with two variables. First, we include a
variable that captures the share of natural resource rents as
a percentage of the national gross domestic product: Natural
Resource Wealth. Natural resource rents are ‘‘the sum of oil
rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral
rents, and forest rents” (World Bank, 2015c). The idea behind
this measure is that natural resource rents are direct income to
the state that—in contrast to tax income, for instance—gov-
ernment elites can capture directly (Morrison, 2009). Second,
we include a measure of foreign aid ﬂows. We utilize data from
the AidData project and construct the variable Foreign Aid
Income, which captures aid income as a percentage of national
GDP (Tierney et al., 2011). Similarly to our measure of natu-
ral resource rents, our aid variable captures non-tax income
available to the government.
To account for potential confounding factors, we also
include control variables in our analysis. Past research indi-
cates that more democratic countries show lower levels of cor-
ruption (Chang & Golden, 2010; Kunicova´ & Rose-
Ackerman, 2005; Montinola & Jackman, 2002). At the same
time, democracy and power-sharing might be related: power-
sharing might obstruct democratic accountability by obscur-
ing political responsibility (Schedler, 1999; Tavits, 2007), 9
while higher levels of democracy might be associated with a
propensity for establishing power-sharing governments. To
isolate the eﬀect of power-sharing from these eﬀects ofdemocratic accountability, we therefore include the Polity2
score measuring the level of democracy in a country. These
scores are taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall,
Jaggers, & Gurr, 2015). Further, ethnic fractionalization has
been found to be negatively correlated with corruption
(Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg,
2003), but we expect it to also be positively associated with
power-sharing (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015). We therefore
include the Ethnic Fractionalization score from Alesina et al.
(2003). We also expect countries with higher GDP Per Capita
to exhibit lower levels of corruption (Treisman, 2007, 236ﬀ).
Finally, we control for the eﬀect that foreign aid ﬂows are sys-
tematically higher to countries with a smaller population
(Hoeﬄer & Outram, 2011). Table 1 provides information on
the operationalization and data source for each variables.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics.5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The objective of our statistical analysis is to estimate the
eﬀect of executive power-sharing on the level of corruption
in a post-conﬂict country. We therefore begin our empirical
analysis with a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
model in the form of
CCij ¼ aþ b1PSij þ b2Resourcesij þ b3Aidij þ b4Controlsij þ ij
ð1Þ
where Control of Corruption ðCCijÞ is predicted by our main
variable of interest Executive Power-Sharing ðPSijÞ, and the
variables Natural Resource Wealth ðResourcesijÞ and Foreign
Aid Income ðAidijÞ. The vector of control variables Controlsij
serves to isolate the eﬀect of executive power-sharing from
context factors previously found to be associated with the level
of corruption in a country. 10
In the ﬁrst stage of our empirical analysis, we begin with this
basic regression model. To explore potentially interactive rela-
tionship between executive power-sharing, non-tax govern-
ment income and corruption, we then add multiplicative
interaction terms between PSij and Resourcesij and Aidij to
our covariates. In the second stage of our empirical analysis,
we consider alternative model speciﬁcations of these three
OLS regression models to assess the robustness of our ﬁnd-
ings. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the concept validity of our
dependent variable and the eﬀect of alternative explanatory
factors. We use robust standard errors clustered on the post-
conﬂict country to account for heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation.
The ﬁnal stage of our empirical analysis addresses endo-
geneity concerns. Executive power-sharing is likely not ran-
domly allocated to post-conﬂict countries. Instead, power-
sharing could be the result of a strategic interaction between
rebels and the government. For example, endogeneity could
occur because more corrupt countries may be more likely to
adopt executive power-sharing institutions (reverse causality)
and/or unobserved factors might aﬀect both the adoption of
power-sharing and determine the level of corruption in a coun-
try. Thus, the coeﬃcient estimate of interest b1 in Eqn. (1)
might be biased. We estimate an endogenous treatment regres-
sion model to address this issue. This type of model allows us
to model the exogenous selection of executive power-sharing
empirically and account for the selection eﬀects in the outcome
equation (Wooldridge, 2010). Speciﬁcally, the model estimates
a linear model for the outcome equation and an auxiliary pro-
bit model for the selection process of the binary treatment
Table 1. Main variables, operationalization, and data sources
Variable Operationalization Data source
Control of corruption Score measuring a country’s level of corruption in relation to the global
average on a scale ranging from 2.5 to 2.5
Worldwide Governance
Indicators (Kaufmann et al.,
2010)
Executive power-sharing Binary variable taking the value of ‘1’ when a rebel groups has taken over
positions in the national government after a peace agreement.
PSED (Ottmann & Vu¨llers, 2015)
Natural resource wealth A country’s share of natural resource rents as a percentage of its national
gross domestic product. Data are log transformed
World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2015c)
Foreign aid income A country’s foreign aid income as per cent of national gross domestic
product. Data are log transformed
AidData Project (Tierney et al.,
2011)
GDP per capita A country’s gross domestic product divided by midyear population in 2005
US dollar. Data are log-transformed
World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2015a)
Polity2 A 21-point indicator ranking a country’s regime type from 10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
Polity IV Project (Marshall et al.,
2015)
Ethnic fractionalization Herﬁndahl index of a country’s ethnic fractionalization ranging from 0 to 1.
The higher the value, the more fractionalized a country, the lower the value,
the more ethnically homogeneous. This variable is time-invariant
Alesina et al. (2003)
Population Midyear estimate of a country’s total population. Data are log-transformed World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2015b)
Table 2. Summary statistics
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Control of corruption 183 0.82 0.41 1.8 0.6
Executive power-sharing 183 0.19 0.39 0.0 1.0
Natural resource wealth (ln) 183 2.20 1.24 0.0 4.5
Foreign aid income (ln) 176 2.42 1.26 6.9 0.7
GDP per capita (ln) 178 7.03 0.96 5.3 9.4
Polity2 180 1.21 5.48 9.0 9.0
Ethnic fractionalization 181 0.59 0.25 0.0 0.9
Population (ln) 183 16.07 1.34 13.2 19.3
66 WORLD DEVELOPMENTvariable. The information from the selection equation on the
propensity of treatment is then included in the outcome regres-
sion to compute consistent estimates of the treatment variable.
Because of the continuous nature of our dependent variable
(Control of Corruption), as well as the binary nature of our
independent/treatment variable (Executive Power-Sharing),
this model is best suited for this type of analysis.
The endogenous treatment regression model is implemented
using Stata 14’s etregress command (StataCorp, 2013) and
is a variant of the Heckman selection models (Heckman,
1979). This command ﬁts two equations, one for the outcome
CCij and one for the treatment PSij:
Outcome equation : CCij ¼ aþ b1PSij þ b2Resourcesij
þ b3Aidij þ b4Controlsij þ ij
Selection equation : PSj ¼
1; if wj þ uj
0; otherwise

ð2Þ
where PSij represents the potentially endogenous treatment
Executive Power-Sharing and wij are the covariates in the
selection equation. The errors ij and mij are assumed to be cor-
related. The model estimates a correlation coeﬃcient q that
indicates to what extend unobservables in the selection equa-
tion correlate with unobservables in the outcome equation.6. RESULTS
Table 3 reports the results from our ﬁrst three OLS
regression models. 11 The coeﬃcient measuring the eﬀect ofExecutive Power-Sharing on the level of corruption is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant in model 1. This supports Hypoth-
esis 1. Power-sharing arrangements in the national executive
are likely to increase corruption in a post-conﬂict country.
In terms of substantive eﬀects, the existence of executive
power-sharing in a post-conﬂict country reduces the Control
of Corruption scale by 0.17, on a scale that ranges from 1.8
to 0.6 with a standard deviation of 0.41. 12
The eﬀect of power-sharing on corruption is estimated while
we control for the shares of natural resources and the coun-
try’s foreign aid income relative to its GDP—that is, the two
main government income sources which can be easily captured
by government elites. While both variables point in a negative
direction, only Natural Resource Wealth is also statistically
signiﬁcant. With a one percent increase in Natural Resource
Wealth relative to GDP, the Control of Corruption scale
decreases by 0.14. Apparently, higher levels of natural
resource wealth also substantially increase corruption in a
post-conﬂict country, in line with existing ﬁndings on the ‘‘re-
source curse” (Ross, 2015, 249). Of our control variables, only
GDP Per Capita is a positive and statistically signiﬁcant pre-
dictor of the level of corruption in model 1 and model 3. How-
ever, we caution against overinterpreting the substantive
eﬀects of control variables which are only intended to isolate
our key relationship of interest.
Models 2 and 3 assess the interactive relationships between
power-sharing and natural resource wealth and foreign aid
income summarized in Hypothesis 2 and 3. Before discussing
our results in greater detail, it is important to point out that
the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms as well as their consti-
tutive terms should not be used for any meaningful interpreta-
tion. Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012) and Brambor, Clark,
Table 3. OLS regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Executive power-sharing 0.17* 0.03 0.06
(0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
Natural resource wealth (ln) 0.13** 0.11** 0.13**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural resource wealth 0.09*
(0.05)
Foreign aid income (ln) 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Executive PS * Foreign aid income 0.05
(0.06)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.08* 0.08 0.08*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Polity2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Population (ln) 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 1.14 1.26* 1.12
(0.69) (0.71) (0.69)
Observations 171 171 171
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.17 0.16
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of interaction terms
can be misleading. As a matter of fact, a statistically signiﬁcant
interactive relationship is often only present at particular val-
ues of its constitutive terms. Assessing the statistical signiﬁ-
cance of coeﬃcients will not reveal this. The aforementioned
scholars therefore recommend using marginal eﬀect plots to
assess the presence of interactive relationships.
Following this advice, we plot the marginal eﬀect of Execu-
tive Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption at the full range
of the values of Natural Resource Wealth and Foreign Aid
Income. The upper plot of Figure 2 shows that the interactive
relationship between executive power-sharing and natural
resources is indeed negative. With increasing levels of Natural
Resource Wealth in a post-conﬂict country, the negative mar-
ginal eﬀect of Executive Power-Sharing on Control of Corrup-
tion increases. This eﬀect becomes statistically signiﬁcant when
Natural Resource Wealth is at 2.2 and the upper bound of the
conﬁdence interval falls below zero. At this point, the point
estimate of the marginal eﬀect of Executive Power-Sharing
on Control of Corruption is 0.17 and it further decreases to
0.38 once the Natural Resource Wealth measure has reached
its maximum value in our sample. The underlying histogram
in our plot also reveals that this statistically signiﬁcant interac-
tive relationship applies to a sizable proportion of the observa-
tions in our sample. Almost 53% of all observations have a
Natural Resource Wealth score of 2.2 or more. This ﬁnding
lends empirical support to Hypothesis 2. 13
Substantively, this means that executive power-sharing has a
negative eﬀect on corruption if the natural resource rents share
of a post-conﬂict country’s GDP is greater than approximately
8%. Such a share of resource rents in a country’s GDP is
roughly equivalent to the size of Cote d’Ivoire’s natural
resource rent income in 2005. This indicates that the negative
eﬀect of power-sharing kicks in even at relatively low levels of
natural resource dependency. At high levels of resource
income, the eﬀect of power-sharing becomes much morepernicious: at 68% of GDP in natural resource rents—roughly
equivalent to Liberia’s resource income levels in 2003—the
coeﬃcient for the eﬀect of cabinet level power-sharing
becomes more than twice the size of the coeﬃcient in the main
model. It appears that executive power-sharing in countries
where government income is heavily based on natural
resources substantially intensiﬁes the corrupt scramble for
such windfall resources.
The opposite is true for the interactive relationship between
executive power-sharing and foreign aid income. The lower
plot in Figure 2 shows that the marginal eﬀect of Executive
Power-Sharing on Control of Corruption increases when For-
eign Aid Income increases. That is, power-sharing in the
national government is aﬃliated with lower levels of corrup-
tion when the international community invests heavily in a
post-conﬂict country. Except for the Foreign Aid Income
scores that are between 4 and 2.4, however, the conﬁdence
interval of the estimated marginal eﬀect covers positive as well
as negative values rendering the marginal eﬀect statistically
insigniﬁcant. Within this small stretch of values, the marginal
eﬀect of Foreign Aid Income on Control of Corruption increases
from 0.26 to 0.18. But the logarithmic values of 4 and 2.4
on the Foreign Aid Income range only correspond to an
increase in the real world foreign aid share of a post-conﬂict
country’s GDP from 0.004 to 0.1. Altogether, therefore, we
do not ﬁnd empirical support for Hypothesis 3. 14
(a) Alternative model speciﬁcations
We also consider alternative model speciﬁcations to explore
the robustness of our ﬁndings. In particular, we investigate the
concept validity of our dependent variable and explore the
eﬀect of alternative determinants of corruption. 15
Data on corruption is notoriously diﬃcult to come by and
fraught with data quality issues (for a recent review, see
Heywood & Rose, 2014). As we have explained in the data sec-
tion, the WGI measure Control of Corruption is the best choice
Figure 2. Marginal eﬀects of executive power-sharing on control of
corruption at diﬀerent levels of non-tax government income. Note: Dashed
lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals. The underlying histogram depicts the
distribution of observations of the variable on the x-axis in the sample.
68 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfor the present analysis. Nevertheless, it is worth exploring
whether the limitations of this measure bias our ﬁndings. First,
we turn to the possibility that the Control of Corruption
measure is not independent of our key explanatory variable,
Executive Power-Sharing. The WGI measure captures
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain at the end of a given year. Our Executive
Power-Sharing measure, in contrast, records the average num-
ber of rebel-held seats over the entire year. If power-sharing
indeed makes it easier for elites to capture the state, the
Control of Corruption measure might code the presence of
power-sharing over the course of a year as an indicator of
higher levels of corruption. To ensure that our dependent vari-
able is measured independently from our central explanatory
variable, we therefore run our models with Executive
Power-Sharing taking the value of ‘‘1” if in January of a given
country-year at least one cabinet post was given to rebels. In
doing so, we create a temporal sequence between Executive
Power-Sharing and the yearly assessment provided by the
WGI measure of corruption. Importantly, our empirical ﬁnd-
ings are not aﬀected by this alternative version of Executive
Power-Sharing (see Table 2 and Figure 1 in our Online
Appendix).Next, scholars emphasize that year-to-year changes in the
WGI measure might not necessarily indicate systematic
change due to external drivers of corruption (Kaufmann
et al., 2010; Heywood & Rose, 2014). Yearly changes in Con-
trol of Corruption can also be caused by changes in the under-
lying data sources and how these individual sources are
aggregated. To account for this possibility, we estimate our
models using year ﬁxed eﬀects. We thereby greatly reduce
the chance that any statistical relationships are driven by a
year-speciﬁc ‘‘shock” as, for example, the inclusion of a previ-
ously unused data source measuring corruption. The results of
OLS regressions with year ﬁxed eﬀects do not diﬀer substan-
tially from the main ﬁndings presented above (see Table 3
and Figure 2 in the Appendix).
As a ﬁnal test of the concept validity of our dependent vari-
able, we estimate our regression models using an alternative
measure of corruption: the corruption scale of the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2015). 16 The ICRG
Corruption measure provides quarterly assessments of the level
of corruption within a country. 17 The measure denotes very
high levels of corruption with 0 and then moves in 0.5 decimal
steps up to 6 which indicates very low levels of corruption. The
ICRG data have more limited geographical coverage than the
WGI measures but provides annual measures from 1984
onward and thus allows us to test our hypotheses using a
longer time-span. 18 As in our main statistical analysis, we rely
on OLS with robust standard errors clustered on post-conﬂict
countries. 19 Again, the results of this robustness check cor-
roborate the ﬁndings our main analysis (see Table 4 and Fig-
ure 3 in the Appendix).
The omission of potentially inﬂuential independent vari-
ables from our regression models constitutes another threat
to the robustness of our ﬁndings. We therefore investigate
whether the estimated eﬀects remain stable in terms of statisti-
cal signiﬁcance and substantive eﬀects when we control for dif-
ferent context factors. Speciﬁcally, we control for non-linear
eﬀects of regime type, an alternative fractionalization measure
and additional power-sharing variables. To begin with, the
relationship between regime type and corruption might be
nonlinear aﬀecting our hypothesized relationships between
executive power-sharing, resources and foreign aid on the
one side and corruption on the other. When we include a
squared term of the Polity2 variable, our main results hold
but it appears that corruption is indeed less likely in more
democratic and more autocratic countries (Table 5 and Figure 4
in the Appendix). The interactive relationships nevertheless
hold when the nonlinear eﬀects of regime type are controlled
for. Next, we rerun our OLS regressions controlling for an
alternative dimension of a country’s societal fractionaliza-
tion—that is, we replace the Ethnic Fractionalization measure
with a Religious Fractionalization score. Again, all our key
ﬁndings hold and the Religious Fractionalization score turns
out not to be statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 6 and Figure 5
in our Online Appendix).
The next series of models controls for the establishment of
additional power-sharing institutions in a post-conﬂict coun-
try. While our theory hypothesizes that it is primarily execu-
tive power-sharing which negatively aﬀects the level of
corruption in a post-conﬂict country, there might still be the
possibility that other common types of power-sharing exert
similar eﬀects. We therefore include a binary variable that
takes the value of ‘‘1” when a territorial power-sharing
arrangement granting autonomy or enacting regional devolu-
tion has been passed by the national parliament. We also
include a binary variable that takes the value of ‘‘1” when
an electoral law promising proportional representation has
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laws are active. The data come from the PSED (Ottmann &
Vu¨llers, 2015). As with our other robustness checks, our
empirical ﬁndings hold. Moreover, neither the presence of ter-
ritorial power-sharing nor the introduction of proportional
representation in the national legislature aﬀects the dependent
variable Control of Corruption (Table 7 and Figure 6 in the
Appendix).
Finally, we explore whether our estimation results continue
to hold if we move beyond the common practice in power-
sharing research of only looking at the ﬁrst ﬁve years of a
post-conﬂict period (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad &
Nilsson, 2008; Walter, 2002). There is the possibility that the
eﬀect of executive power-sharing on corruption disappears
and other factors gain importance if we consider longer
post-conﬂict periods. We therefore estimate our models using
a sample with seven post-conﬂict years and ten post-conﬂict
years. We also include a variable measuring the number of
years since executive power-sharing has ended to account for
time dependency. However, our key ﬁndings remain stable
in this robustness check as well (see Table 8 and Figure 7 in
the Appendix).
(b) Addressing endogeneity
To further increase conﬁdence in a causal interpretation of
the eﬀect of power-sharing on corruption, we also estimate a
treatment eﬀect model where we account for the endogenous
selection of power-sharing in post-conﬂict countries. The
challenge of correctly estimating such a selection model stems
from the need to ﬁnd an exogenous variable, the so-called
‘‘exclusion restriction”. This exclusion restriction must be cor-
related with the treatment variable, but not with the outcome
variable.
We use two variables as exclusion restrictions: per cent of
country territory in conﬂict (Conﬂict Area) and power parity
between rebel and government troops (Gov’t-Rebel Parity).
These two variables proxy the nature of government-rebel
power relations in a civil war. Past research (Gent, 2011) sees
these power relations as a central determinant of the emer-
gence of power-sharing in post-conﬂict situations. The idea
behind Conﬂict Area as an exclusion restriction is that we
expect power-sharing to become more likely when more terri-
tory is engulfed by the conﬂict. A greater conﬂict area can be
seen as a rough proxy for rebel success on the battleﬁeld:
although the variable does not directly capture rebel territorial
gains, a larger conﬂict area nevertheless indicates a higher
chance of loss for the incumbent regime because it indicates
that the government does not have full control over its state
territory. Conversely, if the conﬂict area is small, we should
expect the chances of power-sharing to decrease since the gov-
ernment will be more likely to expect to win the war, as it can
concentrate its forces. At the same time, Conﬂict Area is unli-
kely to be correlated with post-conﬂict corruption. It is a
conﬂict-level variable that captures the military strategy objec-
tives of both parties and should therefore be exogenous to the
level of corruption.
We use the PRIO Conﬂict Site Dataset (Hallberg, 2012) to
generate our Conﬂict Area variable. The PRIO Conﬂict Site
Dataset captures the ‘‘area of the conﬂict zone in square kilo-
meters” (Hallberg, 2011, p. 4). We divide this area by a coun-
try’s territorial size (taken from the cshapes R package
(Weidmann, Kuse, & Gleditsch, 2010)) to generate a value
between 0 and 1 that indicates the total territorial share of
the conﬂict area. A ﬁrst glance at the data reveals that there
is indeed a positive relationship between conﬂict area andpower-sharing: many countries with power-sharing arrange-
ments—such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Nepal, or Liberia—all have Conﬂict Area
scores above 0.5. The relationship is not deterministic how-
ever. A number of countries—such as Azerbaijan, Haiti or
Mozambique—also have large Conﬂict Area values, but did
not establish power-sharing arrangements.
The second exclusion restriction we employ is the variable
Gov’t-Rebel Parity. The idea behind this variable is that power
parity between rebels and government is a proxy for a military
stalemate between both parties which in turn makes power-
sharing more likely. At the same time, power parity is unlikely
to be related to national post-conﬂict levels of corruption,
since it, too, is a conﬂict-level variable that captures the
short-term tactical balance between the adversaries. It is a
dummy variable that captures whether rebels and government
forces are roughly equal in size or not. Data on government
and rebel troop strength are taken from the Non-State Actor
Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2013).
Table 4 reports the results from our endogenous treatment
models. Model 1 in Table 4 shows that the coeﬃcient for Exec-
utive Power-Sharing is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
from zero. This conﬁrms our ﬁndings from the previous sec-
tion. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient is more than twice as large
as in the models without accounting for selection bias. This
means that if we account for the endogenous selection of
power-sharing, the eﬀect of power-sharing on corruption
becomes even more pronounced. And selection indeed seems
to be an issue: both Conﬂict Area and Gov’t-Rebel Parity are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant predictors of implemented
executive power-sharing in the selection equation. Also, the
correlation coeﬃcient q between the error terms of the selec-
tion and the outcome equation is 0.54 and statistically signif-
icant. This means that unobservables in the selection model
are systematically correlated with unobservables in the out-
come equation. Models 2 and 3 replicate the previous models
with interaction between Executive Power-Sharing and Natu-
ral Resource Wealth and Foreign Aid Income, respectively.
Although the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, marginal eﬀects plots reveal that there are
meaningful areas of statistically signiﬁcant interaction between
Executive Power-Sharing and Natural Resource Wealth
roughly in line with the marginal eﬀects estimated in our sim-
ple OLS regression (see Figure 8 in our Online Appendix).
Thus, even if we account econometrically for systematic selec-
tion, power-sharing leads to more corruption at higher levels
of natural resource income.7. DISCUSSION
Do power-sharing institutions drive corruption in the after-
math of civil war? Viewed through the lens of political econ-
omy theory, power-sharing institutions oﬀer rent-seeking
elites an opportunity to access rents from state resources. In
addition, many rebel elites may feel—now that they can access
state revenues—that they are entitled to privately compensate
themselves and their supporters for the perceived injustices
they suﬀered during the conﬂict. Further, since elites within
the power-sharing arrangement cannot be certain that they
will be represented in the post-transitional political order, they
have strong incentives to capture as many state resources as
possible. As a consequence, power-sharing institutions
increase a post-conﬂict country’s level of corruption. Evidence
from a range of statistical models provides support for this
hypothesis: post-conﬂict countries with power-sharing exhibit
Table 4. OLS regression with endogenous treatment eﬀects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
DV: Control of Corruption
Executive power-sharing 0.38** 0.27 0.37*
(0.16) (0.25) (0.22)
Natural resource wealth (ln) 0.13** 0.12** 0.13***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Executive PS * Natural resource wealth 0.05
(0.06)
Foreign aid income (ln) 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Executive PS * Foreign aid income 0.00
(0.06)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Polity2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.30 0.29 0.30
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Population (ln) 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.90 0.97 0.90
(0.66) (0.69) (0.66)
DV: Executive Power-Sharing
Natural resource wealth (ln) 0.33* 0.33* 0.33*
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Foreign aid income (ln) 0.35** 0.35* 0.35**
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.27 0.27 0.27
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Polity2 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Ethnic fractionalization 3.46** 3.45** 3.46**
(1.41) (1.41) (1.41)
Population (ln) 0.39* 0.39* 0.39*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Gov’t-rebel parity 1.18** 1.19** 1.18**
(0.51) (0.52) (0.51)
Conﬂict area (ln) 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Peace years 2.78* 2.76* 2.78*
(1.46) (1.46) (1.47)
Peace years (squared) 1.10** 1.09** 1.10**
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54)
Peace years (cubed) 0.12** 0.12** 0.12**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant 3.05 3.14 3.04
(4.03) (4.07) (4.03)
q 0.54** 0.50* 0.54**
(0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Observations 168 168 168
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses, * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
70 WORLD DEVELOPMENTa higher degree of corruption as compared to post-conﬂict
countries without this institutional arrangement in place. Also,
this relationship depends on the resources available to the
elites within the power-sharing cabinet. In a context of natural
resource abundance, the corruption-inducing eﬀect of power-
sharing becomes stronger.
The ﬁndings presented here open up important avenues for
further inquiry. As our main focus was to establish the link
between power-sharing and corruption as an indicator for
elites’ rent-seeking behavior, we have not analyzed whetherit is indeed the economic function of power-sharing institu-
tions that drives their success in upholding peace after violent
civil conﬂict. We are conﬁdent that future studies that try to
disentangle the complicated relationship between power-
sharing and peace would beneﬁt from including the political
economy of this institutional arrangement in their theoretical
and empirical models.
Another key avenue for further research is the relationship
between power-sharing governments and accountability.
While we have controlled for the quality of democratic institu-
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sharing on corruption from broader accountability factors,
future research should explicitly incorporate democratic
accountability into its theoretical and empirical models of
power-sharing governments and further explore its implica-
tions. Norris (2008) has already discussed how constitutional
power-sharing mechanisms (e.g., parliamentarism, propor-
tional representation electoral systems, and federalism) are
capable of improving democracy. Our ﬁndings indicate that
it is also important to analyze how the political economy of
executive power-sharing arrangements aﬀects the quality of
democratic accountability in post-conﬂict countries. In this
regard, a promising avenue for future research is the investiga-
tion of the patron-client relationships between elites in power-
sharing governments and their constituencies and their impact
on conceptions of vertical accountability between elites and
citizens, citizen engagement, and the public responsiveness of
the post-conﬂict state—particularly once the interim period
of power-sharing ends. Ultimately, such research has the
potential to contribute to existing debates in development
studies on how to improve and promote the voice of citizens
in post-conﬂict countries (Fox, 2015).
Our ﬁndings are also relevant to the policy and academic
debate about power-sharing and the eﬀects of corruption on
post-conﬂict peacebuilding (Transparency International,
2014; Working Group on Corruption and Security, 2017).
The qualitative literature has long promoted a nuanced viewof corruption in post-conﬂict situations (Cheng & Zaum,
2013). On the one hand, some argue that corruption can have
a stabilizing eﬀect in post-conﬂict situations: ‘‘[Corruption]
can be used in the short term to craft a peace where the spoils
of war are divided amongst the ﬁghting factions; in some
cases, it may be the only way to provide the stability needed
to achieve other peacebuilding objectives” (Cheng & Zaum,
2013, 22f). However, corruption also undermines economic
development and thus reduces economic peace dividends for
large parts of the population. If post-conﬂict elites divert pub-
lic resources, both from aid and from natural resources, into
their own pockets, post-conﬂict development is hampered.
Yet this view has largely been based on qualitative and anec-
dotal case study evidence. Using novel data on power-sharing
and rebel participation in post-conﬂict governance, we show
that this pattern is generalizable to a wider set of post-
conﬂict countries. Further, while the level of corruption is gen-
erally higher in post-conﬂict countries than in other countries,
our statistical results suggest that it is the institution of power-
sharing that particularly drives political corruption in the
aftermath of civil conﬂicts. Policy-makers and academics
should therefore be cautious when promoting power-sharing
as go-to solution for terminating civil conﬂicts: while it may
oﬀer the possibility to buy oﬀ former opponents in the short
term and thus stabilize volatile post-conﬂict situations,
power-sharing might undermine economic development and
peacebuilding in the long run by institutionalizing corruption.NOTES1. While not the focus of this study, it might nevertheless be worthwhile
to further probe the impact of executive power-sharing on the size of
winning coalitions in future research. For example, it could be possible
that such power-sharing arrangements do not enlarge the winning
coalition per se but rather the increase the number of clients who elites
in the winning coalition have to accommodate. In such a case, we would
probably also see an increase in elite corruption.
2. In essence, power-sharing governments formalize what North et al.
(2012) have called a ‘‘Limited Access Order:” they limit the access of other
social groups to the governing coalition—the power-sharing coalition
between rebels and the government—thus creating material beneﬁts in the
form of rents from the state for the participating elites and their clients.
3. Following the general deﬁnition, we understand foreign aid not only
as ﬁnancial aid, but also as technical transfers in the form of loans, grants,
or equity investments by governments (or their aid agencies), inter-
governmental organizations and private foundations (cf. Tierney et al.,
2011).
4. UCDP deﬁnes civil war as a ‘‘contested incompatibility that concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least
25 battle-related deaths” (Themne´r & Wallensteen, 2013).
5. For a similar approach, see Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates, and Elster
(2012).
6. Unless this procedure resulted in a country-year in 2010 which we then
included. An example of this is Sri Lanka, where UCDP records a conﬂict
in 2009, but not in 2010. Consequently, we include the country-year Sri
Lanka in 2010 in our sample, even though this period is not two years
long.7. See Table 1 in the Online Appendix for a list of countries and post-
conﬂict country-years included in our analysis.8. We do not replace missing values in our empirical analysis. However,
we test the robustness of our ﬁndings using two strategies. First, we
replace missing Control of Corruption values with the previous non-
missing values. Second, we replace missing values with a linear interpo-
lation of Control of Corruption on year using Stata 14’s ipolate
command (StataCorp, 2015). The results do not change substantially and
the ﬁndings remain robust.9. Almost by deﬁnition, power-sharing undermines the separation of
powers and therefore weakens horizontal accountability (Lijphart, 1977).
Similarly, post-conﬂict power-sharing arrangements are interim or
transitional arrangements which are not the result of electoral
competition but agreed upon during peace negotiations (Schmidt &
Galyan, 2016). Only once interim arrangements end do national elections
take place. Vertical accountability in the form of elections is therefore also
absent during this transition period. We are grateful to an anonymous
reviewer for highlighting this argument and discuss its implications for
future research in the conclusion of this paper.10. This logic follows the general advice by Angrist and Pischke (2009)
that control variables make the conditional independence assumption of a
treatment (power-sharing) more credible. The control variables
themselves, however, are unlikely to have a causal interpretation, since
we do not speciﬁcally control for other factors that might make their
interpretation causally credible.
11. The statistical analysis was performed with Stata Statistical Software
Version 14.2 (StataCorp, 2015).
72 WORLD DEVELOPMENT12. The eﬀect size of Executive Power-Sharing and all other statistically
signiﬁcant predictors remains roughly the same in the alternative
speciﬁcations of our models presented below.
13. In this particular case, the interaction term in model 2 is actually also
statistically signiﬁcant. Regarding its constitutive elements, it is important
to remember that they only measure the eﬀect of each coeﬃcient
conditional on the other constitutive term being ‘‘0” (Brambor et al.,
2006). In the case of model 2, this means that the coeﬃcient of Executive
Power-Sharing only measures the eﬀect of executive power-sharing if
Natural Resource Wealth is ‘‘0.” This applies to 19 observations in our
sample. Interestingly, Natural Resource Wealth still exerts a negative eﬀect
on our dependent variable Control of Corruption in model 2. That is, post-
conﬂict countries with a larger share of natural resource wealth relative to
GDP are also more likely to be more corrupt when there is no executive
power-sharing.
14. Turning to the constitutive elements of this interactive relationship, it
needs to be stressed again that the coeﬃcient of Executive Power-Sharing
only measures the eﬀect of executive power-sharing if Foreign Aid Income
is ‘‘0.” There is no instance where Foreign Aid Income equals ‘‘0.” The
coeﬃcient of Executive Power-Sharing in model 3 is therefore meaningless.
As explained previously, the interpretation of our non-tax government
income coeﬃcients is restricted to those cases where Executive Power-
Sharing is ‘‘0.” Foreign Aid Income remains statistically insigniﬁcant in
model 3.15. Our Online Appendix presents the results of our robustness checks in
greater detail.
16. We use the replication dataset from Hegre and Nyga˚rd (2015) to
conduct this robustness check.
17. The ICRG Corruption score is ‘‘a measure of corruption within the
political system that is a threat to foreign investment by distorting the
economic and ﬁnancial environment, reducing the eﬃciency of govern-
ment and business by enabling people to assume positions of power
through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability
into the political process” (PRS Group, 2015).
18. We did not opt to use the PRS measure as our main dependent
variable since it lacks data on a number of countries that are of interest to
us—for example, Afghanistan, Burundi or Nepal.
19. While the ordinal nature of the ICRG Corruption measure would
normally best be explored with ordinal logit or probit models, past
research has shown that OLS estimates of the ICRG data are reasonably
close to those obtained through ordinal logit or probit models (Treisman,
2007, p. 221). Moreover, using OLS instead of ordinal logit/probit gives us
a direct relationship between a one unit change in the independent variable
and changes to the dependent variable.
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